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Abstract 
In Vietnam, a quasi private property regime has been established in 1993 with the issuance of 
exchangeable and mortgageable long term land use right certificates. Using primary 
qualitative and quantitative data collected in a mountainous district of Northern Vietnam, this 
paper investigates the role of the land policy in the adoption of soil conservation technologies 
by farmers. This issue is of crucial importance in the region where population growth and 
growing market demands have induced farmers to intensify agricultural production. While 
poverty has been reduced, environmental problems such as soil erosion, landslides, and 
declining soil fertility have become more severe over the past years. Among the abundant 
literature on the impact of property rights and formal land titles in developing countries, only 
a few studies have focused on the adoption of soil conservation technologies: an important 
element in sustainable development strategies of fragile agro-ecological areas confronted with 
increasing population densities. 
Our findings suggest that soil conservation technologies are perceived as being economically 
unattractive; therefore, most upland farmers continue to practice the prevailing erosion-prone 
cultivation system. Focusing on agroforestry as one major soil conservation option, we 
estimate household and plot level econometric models to empirically assess the determinants 
of adoption. We find that the possession of a formal land title influences adoption, but that the 
threat of land re-allocations in villages discourages adoption by creating uncertainty and 
tenure insecurity.  
We conclude that more efforts are needed from decision-makers to promote and support the 
adoption of conservation practices and to clarify objectives of the land policy in order to 
secure land tenure and foster sustainable development in fragile areas.  
 
Key words: Land titling policy, technology adoption, upland agriculture. 
 
 
 
 
  iv
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Land titling policy and soil conservation in the northern uplands of 
Vietnam 
Camille Saint-Macary, Alwin Keil, Manfred Zeller, Franz Heidhues, Pham Thi My Dung 
1 Introduction 
Beginning with the Doi Moi policies in 1986, Vietnam has engaged in important institutional 
reforms in order to lead its economy from a centrally planned to a market oriented system. In 
rural areas, reforms were designed to empower farmer’s decision-making capacity as a way to 
boost production and encourage the protection of natural resources. In this perspective, the 
land allocation policy, and the issuance of long-term land use right certificates to households 
have been among the most important measures taken by the state.  
Our research focused on the Northern Mountain Region (NMR), an area inhabited 
predominantly by ethnic minorities6. Rapid population growth over the past 20 years has led 
to an increasing scarcity of arable land driving agricultural production up onto the steep 
slopes. Moreover, the increasing demand for food and feed from urban areas has induced 
farmers to further intensify the production of an erosion-prone crop, maize, on the hillsides. 
Soil erosion and landslides have become important issues as they lead to reduced soil fertility 
in the uplands, sedimentation of lowland water reservoirs, irrigation channels and paddy fields 
as well as severely damaging road infrastructure. Unchecked, these practices could affect the 
greater population as they threaten the sustainability of agricultural production in the 
mountainous area as well as local infrastructure and, at a larger scale, the quality of drinking 
water in the lowlands. Soil conservation technologies (SCT) are thus a major tool for 
sustaining livelihoods and agricultural production at the individual farm level and ensure food 
security for coming generations.  
The determinants of soil degradation and the adoption of conservation practices have been 
widely investigated in the literature. While techniques to limit erosion on cropped fields are 
numerous and diverse, most of them share two common features: first, they incur opportunity 
costs in terms of land and labour that are not available for cropping activities any longer; 
these costs may be rather high, especially if SCT compete with profitable cash crops. And, 
second, SCT enhance soil fertility in the medium to long run only (1994). The adoption 
                                                 
6 The Vietnamese ethnic, the Kinh, represent about 82 % of the country’s population. The rest of the population 
is composed of 53 other ethnic groups located for most of them in mountainous regions. 
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 decision of SCT involves intra- and intertemporal utility tradeoffs (Grepperud, 1997, 
McConnell, 1983). Poor farmers living in an environment of incomplete credit markets, 
insecure land tenure, and short planning horizons are unlikely to invest in such technologies, 
because of potential risks on consumption (Shively, 2001). State interventions that secure land 
tenure, provide safety nets to rural households, and relax constraints on liquidity via credits to 
farmers are thus expected to reduce poverty and encourage natural resource conservation and 
protection (Lutz, Pagiola and Reiche, 1994).  
In particular, it is expected that, by securing land tenure, improving access to formal credit, 
and increasing land transactions, land titling policies increase investment incentives and  
foster rural development (Deininger and Feder, 2001). The formalization of property rights is, 
according de Soto (2000), a major step toward development and poverty alleviation as it 
enables poor households to transform their assets into productive capital. Notwithstanding this 
consensus, empirical studies conducted in different countries do not find that property rights 
have large and positive effects as investment incentives including formal land titles in 
particular (see Bromley (2009) for a review). Rather, it seems that the issuance of formal land 
titles has not necessarily led to increased tenure security and to higher investments on land. 
Legal pluralism and the co-existence of formal and informal land institutions may cause high 
enforcement costs, and lead to inefficiency of the land institutions (Meinzen-Dick and 
Pradhan, 2003, Platteau, 1996). The absence or imperfection of labour or credit markets may 
as well limit investment capacities, and the efficient allocation of land among farmers, 
making for inefficient land institutions. Recent empirical studies have found that land titles 
may benefit certain types of households more than others, for example the richest households 
in Paraguay (Carter and Olinto, 2003) or the powerful ones in Ghana  (Goldstein and Udry, 
2007).   
Regarding soil conservation practices, Soule et al. (2000) find that land owners in the United 
States have a higher propensity to adopt such technologies than cash or share-renters. Shively 
(2001) also concludes that land tenure is an important determinant of SCT adoption in the 
Philippines. In Vietnam, using national living standard survey data, Do et al. (2008) find that 
the 1993 land law has significantly increased the allocation of land to perennial crops, 
although the effect is only of small magnitude. In contrast with most of the existing literature 
on Vietnam’s land titling policy, this paper proposes a small scale and detailed study which 
allows to control for local factors potentially relevant in explaining the impact of land titles on 
investment incentives. 
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 The objectives of the paper are (1) to describe how the land titling policy has been 
implemented in the NMR, (2) to assess upland farmers’ knowledge and adoption of soil 
conservation technologies, and (3) to identify the influencing factors of the adoption of such 
measures household and plot level econometric models and controlling for knowledge. We 
focus in particular on the role of the land titling policy in fostering such investments. 
After outlining the land reform and its implementation in Vietnam in Section 2, we describe 
the research area in Section 3 and present our data and sampling procedure in Section 4. The 
estimation strategy for our regression models is described in Section 5, results are presented 
in Section 6. In Section 7 we discuss the results and draw conclusions.  
2 Reform of land institutions and implementation in the NMR 
Prior to 1981, agricultural land, means of production, and production output were fully 
managed by the collectives, namely the village cooperatives. The first reform of tenurial 
contracts was implemented by Directive 100 in 1981, which allowed farmers to keep the 
surplus produced in excess of the contracted output for home consumption. The series of 
directives that followed were designed to increase the flexibility of the land management and 
taxation systems in order to raise investment incentives, increase production levels, and 
overcome food insecurity (Que, 2005). The collective farming system officially ended with 
the 1988 land law (Resolution 10) and the allocation of collective land to private households 
according to family size. The land is still owned by the Vietnamese people (and managed by 
the state); farmers initially received land use rights for a period of fifteen years.  
The 1993 land law granted five rights to land users: the right to exchange, transfer, mortgage, 
inherit, and lease out the land. Land use certificates (known as Red Books) were issued to 
users for a period of 20 years for annual crops and for 50 years for perennial crops. The law 
confirms that the land is publicly owned, it is therefore a quasi-private land management 
system. Through local authorities the state maintains control over transactions, rental 
contracts, and more importantly on the general land use plans.  
This policy represents one of the largest land titling programs ever implemented throughout 
the developing world with around 11 million titles issued in 2000  (Do and Iyer, 2008) and 
was assessed by observers and researchers as egalitarian (Ravallion and van de Walle, 2001). 
Its implementation however has been a costly process, and has not been evenly achieved in 
the regions. In 1998 less than half of the total area in NMR had been allocated with a 
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 certificate (Do and Iyer, 2003). The considerable administrative costs involved for measuring 
land, issuing and registering the certificates and the lack of qualified personnel were the main 
explanation of this slowness Haque, et al. (1996). Secondly, in mountainous regions, the 
enforcement of the land law has been contested by some ethnic groups who returned instead 
to traditional land management systems when collective farming ended (see Corlin (1997) on 
H’mong villages; Mellac (2006) and Sikor (2004) on Thai communities). Sikor (2004) reports 
cases of conflicts in Thai communities in Yen Chau district where village heads refused at 
first to allocate paddy fields as directed by the Red Book, preferring instead the traditional 
allocation system in which the village head regularly reallocates paddy fields to villagers. 
Corlin (1997) reports the same types of conflicts over rights allocation and the conflict with 
ancestral rights in H’mong communities. In some regions these conflicts have been solved by 
re-allocations along with strong enforcement by the provincial government (cf. section 6). 
Uncertainty still persists on whether these rights will be reallocated at the end of the use right 
term (20 years). Despite repeated interventions of the ministry of agriculture stipulating that 
no reallocation will occur, an important share of farmers still expect the contrary and are 
reluctant to operate land transactions7.  
3 The research area 
The study region is Yen Chau district, a mountainous area inhabited primarily by ethnic 
minorities (85%). The largest ethnic groups are the Thai (Black Thai) with about 55% of the 
district’s population, followed by the H’mong who account for 20%, and the Kinh, “ethnic 
Vietnamese” who represent 13% of the district’s population. The Thai and the Kinh were the 
first settlers in the area and occupied the lowlands, while later arrivals, such as the H’mong, 
settled mainly in the highlands (Neef, Friederichsen, Sangkapitux and Thac, 2002). Lowland 
villages along the highway benefit from greater access to infrastructure (i.e. markets, paved 
roads, and irrigation systems) and are relatively better off than villages located in higher 
altitudes. Between 1988 and 2006 the districts’ population rose by 50% at a growth rate of 
2.4% annually.  
 
                                                 
7 cf. Interview of Mr. Dang Hung Vo, Vice Minister of Natural Resources and Environment (28/08/2007)   
[ONLINE in Vietnamese http://www.agro.gov.vn/news/newsDetail.asp?targetID=2128, (last accessed, 
27/11/2008). 
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 Farmers nowadays cultivate two main crops: rice as a subsistence crop grown in irrigated 
paddy fields of the lowlands and maize as a cash crop in the uplands. The rapid development 
of the livestock sector accompanied by rising maize prices and the shortage of rainfall have 
pushed farmers to intensify maize production and abandon rice cultivation in the uplands. 
Thus, the area allocated to maize cultivation has more than tripled over the last twenty years 
while the area allocated to upland rice has decreased by 27%, according to the district 
statistical office. Nowadays, farmers plant on average 71% of arable land are cropped with 
maize from April to September, and left uncovered the rest of the year, exposed to wind and 
rainfall. As a consequence, the area is susceptible to erosion leading to an increasing 
incidence of sedimentation and landslides during the rainy seasons over the past years. 
4 Sampling and data collection 
A household survey was conducted in 2007/2008 in Yen Chau district. In selecting the 
households, a cluster sampling procedure was followed where a village-level sampling frame 
was constructed encompassing all villages of the district8, including information on the 
number of resident households. First, 20 villages were randomly selected using the 
Probability Proportionate to Size (PPS) method (Carletto, 1999). Next, 15 households were 
randomly selected in each of these villages using updated village-level household lists. Since 
the PPS method accounts for differences in the number of resident households between 
villages in the first stage, this sampling procedure results in a self-weighing sample (Carletto, 
1999). In total the database consists of 300 households and 2279 agricultural plots, among 
which 2059 are operated by farmers and 1190 are upland plots, i.e., rain-fed plots dedicated to 
crop production other than paddy rice. Both the household and plot samples are representative 
at the district and village levels. The survey covered a wide range of topics, including 
quantitative and qualitative questions on the effect and perceptions of soil conservation 
technologies.  
In addition, we conducted focus group discussions using semi-structured interview guidelines 
to collect information on village history and composition, and to reconstruct the land 
allocation process chronologically. A visual timeline was elaborated with respondents in order 
                                                 
8 Except for the villages in four sub-districts bordering Laos, for which research permits are very difficult to 
obtain. 
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 to facilitate these recall questions, and a standardized questionnaire gathered the necessary 
background data. The respondents were part of the current and former village boards. 
5 Estimation strategy 
9We estimate the determinants of farmers’ decision to invest in agroforesty , and in particular 
the effect of the land titling policy on adoption incentives. Since aggregating different 
technologies that imply different costs and benefits over time may be misleading (cf. Section 
6), we focus on agroforestry which is one of the most widely known measures against soil 
erosion in the study area and is also perceived to be one of the most effective (cf. Table 1).  
The investigation of adoption determinants in a population where the diffusion of innovation 
is incomplete may lead to biased estimates (Diagne and Demont, 2007). Selection bias arises 
when exposed and unexposed farmers differ in their propensity to adopt the technology10. 
This may be the case for at least two reasons. First, knowledge acquisition is part of the 
farmers’ adoption decision and therefore endogenous, and second, for efficiency reasons 
agricultural extension may especially target farmers or communities with a high innovative 
capacity. Table 3 shows that knowledge diffusion for agroforestry is incomplete in the study 
area, suggesting the use of a selection bias correction model.  
Our problem can be written as follows: 
[ ] NNNi kk <∈∀ ,,1  [ ]01 11 >+= iii uXy β 12 =iy  if  
       otherwise      ( 1)  0=
[ ]01 22 >+= iii vXy δ [ ]Ni ,1∈∀      ( 2) 
where: is the total population, and , the subpopulation of households knowing 
agroforestry as a SCT;  and  are binary dependent variables indicating the adoption and 
knowledge status of the i
N kN
iy1 iy2
th household respectively; and are vectors of regressors; iX1 iX 2
                                                 
9 “Agroforestry is a collective name for land-use systems in which woody perennials are deliberately grown on 
the same piece of land as agricultural crops and/or animals” Lundgren (1982). By agroforestry, we refer to a 
cultivation technique consisting in planting trees and/or shrubs on a cultivated land as a way to limit soil 
erosion and improve soil fertility.  The plants mostly used in the study area are wild tamarind (leucaena 
leucocephola), teak trees and pine trees.  
10 In this context selection bias is also termed exposure bias in the literature, e.g. by Diagne and Demont (2007). 
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 ( ii vu , )
                                                
 are the error terms, we assume that they are jointly bivariate normally distributed.  The 
covariance matrix is: . ( ) =ii vu ,cov ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
2
2
v
u
σρ
ρσ
We use a Heckman full maximum likelihood procedure to jointly estimate the probability of 
knowing and adopting the technology and control for selection bias (Heckman, 1979). The 
model predicts household’s probability to adopt and maintain agroforestry on at least one of 
its plots conditional on variables  and on knowing agroforestry11iX1  (Table 2).  
Table 1 summarizes the explanatory variables (  and ). Following literature on 
knowledge acquisition and learning (Conley and Udry, 2001, Feder and Slade, 1984, Foster 
and Rosenzweig, 1995), we expect that those farmers who are well connected socially, have 
good communication assets, higher education levels, and good access to extension services 
also have greater access to information. We use two measures of social capital in order to 
differentiate the effect of “horizontal” social capital, i.e., connections of individuals with their 
peers, and “vertical” social capital, i.e., connections with individuals who have better access 
to information. The former is measured by the participation of adults in any organizations, 
while the latter measures how well the household is connected with the mass organizations
iX1 iX 2
12 
in its village by assessing how easily help is obtained in case of problems. As indicators of 
wealth, we use size of the farm and the share of off farm income in cash income. The other 
variables control for access to agricultural extension, human capital and possession of 
communication assets.  
Among regressors of adoption, control variables account for household (human and social 
capital), soil, and farm characteristics, as well as geographic location. In addition, we include 
a regressor indicating whether material support was received by the household to implement 
agroforestry13. Material support includes labour, in-kind inputs (seeds, seedlings or fertilizer, 
for instance) or cash support. Such support is either provided by governmental or non-
governmental organizations in the research area to encourage certain farmers to adopt 
 
( 1 2 11 1,i iP y y X= = )i11 The probability  is derived in Wooldridge (2002): pp.477-78 and 570-71. 
12 In Vietnam, the mass organizations play a crucial role and are present at all administrative levels (from the 
village to the state). They are composed of six unions representing women, farmers, veteran, elderly, youth 
and the fatherland front union. In addition to participating in major village decisions, these organizations 
carry out multiple tasks: from extension agents to rural bank staffs. 
13 The comparison of means show that there are no systematic differences in characteristics that may influence 
adoption (human, social, and financial capital) between those that have been supported, and the rest. We 
conclude that attribution of support was random regarding characteristics that also influence adoption, and 
that there is consequently no endogeneity. 
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 agroforestry. Hereby, several goals are pursued: firstly, to target farmers with a low 
investment capacity; secondly, extension organizations may target influential or exemplary 
farmers as a way to disseminate a technology (using a demonstration plot); finally, it may be 
intended to enforce adoption in areas of strategic importance, such as easily visible locations 
close to the main road14.  
We hypothesize that improved access to credit is conducive to the adoption of agroforestry 
based SCT because it relaxes liquidity and/or consumption constraints, and reduce farmers 
discount rates. This will lead to a higher value being attached to benefits from reduced soil 
erosion that accrue in the future. We use a binary variable indicating whether a household is 
credit constrained. Following Zeller (1994), we consider farmers to be credit constrained if 
they did not apply for credit for fear of rejection or if they applied for a loan but were partially 
or fully rejected by the lenders15. 
A positive and significant sign of the land title variable would indicate that land title is 
perceived as a guarantee of tenure security thus encouraging farmers to engage in soil 
conservation. Apart from being registered and operated under a title, the land can be leased 
from a private households with a defined time period and/or a fixed payment; lent or given by 
private households with no payment and for an undefined time period; leased or borrowed 
from the village fund land; or cultivated without agreement or informally purchased (Table 3). 
With this variable on land title, we test our main hypothesis - that tenure is perceived to be 
more secure when land is operated under title than under any of the other tenurial 
arrangements. Place et al. (2000) recommend to treat tenure security as endogenous in long 
term investment estimations, as it was observed that farmers in some countries may undertake 
some investments to secure tenure, and obtain land titles. In our case, the fact that land titles 
have been distributed to all households on all land at a certain point in time (cf. section 6 and 
Table 3) excludes risk of endogeneity. 
As outlined in section 6, the implementation of the land policy in the study area has resulted 
in successive reallocations and a majority of farmers expect further reallocations to take place 
before the end of the use right term. While the issuance of a land title was supposed to 
                                                 
14 It was mentioned that some farmers having their plot located close to the National road had been strongly 
encouraged to implement hedgerows on their field so as to create positive impressions on officials and 
visitors passing by the area. 
15 The literature on credit and technology adoption suggests that this variable is endogenous (i.e. correlated with 
unobserved factors of adoption such as entrepreneurial capacity). The test of endogeneity conducted on this 
variable does not reject exogeneity, with various specifications and various measures of credit access. We 
therefore treat this variable as exogenous in the model. 
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 empower farmers as decision makers over the use of their land, the successive reallocations 
send a contradictory signal, showing users that the state remains the primary decision maker 
over land issues. We test the hypothesis that this threat of land reallocations is perceived as a 
source of insecurity and therefore acts as a disincentive for long-term agricultural 
investments, such as SCT. The variable testing this effect measures the share of villagers who 
believe that a reallocation is likely to occur before the end of the use right term. 
Using the household-level model we are able to test whether our estimates would be affected 
by exposure bias if we did not account for farmers’ knowledge of the technology. Since we do 
not find evidence of exposure bias (cf. Section 6 ), it is safe to estimate a plot-level model in 
which we do not account for prior exposure to the technology. A plot-level model can more 
accurately control the effect of soil characteristics ( ijX 3 j, summarized in Table 2), slope, or 
plot size; factors expected to strongly influence farmers’ adoption decision. 
More importantly, the household-level model may not bring satisfactory results regarding the 
effect of tenure on adoption. Farmers in northern Vietnam cultivate a relatively large number 
of scattered plots (10 on average in our sample – among which 4 are upland plots). Almost 
half of farmers (48%) in our sample operate both titled and untitled plots. Given the variation 
of conditions within a same household, the aggregation of plot-level variables to the 
household-level induces a loss of information on whether agroforestry is adopted on (non-) 
titled plots. Following previous literature on property rights (see Besley (1995) and Hayes et 
al. (1997) for example) we develop a plot-level model of adoption in order to identify the 
effect of tenure on adoption. After all, it matters whether the long-term benefits of 
agroforestry can be reaped by the farmer on a given plot.  
The plot level model can be written as: 
3 3 11 0ij ij i ijy X Xα β ε⎡ ⎤= + + >⎣ ⎦         
[ ]kNi ,1∈[ ]iTj ,1∈ , ,   NN k <
where  indicates the adoption status of agroforestry by farmer i on plot j, and is the 
number of upland plots operated by household i.  We cluster the standard error at the 
household level in order to account for heteroskedasticity as well the non-independence of 
observations within a household, as suggested by Wooldridge (2006).  
iTijy3
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 Table 1: Description and summary statistics of household-level variables 
Variable Description Mean St. Dev
Know agroforestry HHa/   0.42  knows agroforestry as SCT  (yes=1, no=0) 0.50
Human and social capital  
Highest educated member has a high school certificate  (yes=1, 
no=0)   0.05  Education + 0.23
43.16  Age + Age of the household head 12.66
  1.49  Peer connections Average participation in organisation per adult 0.67
 Vertical connections Number of problems for which it is easy to get help from Unionb/   2.01 2.00
Communication and extension   
0.82  Television HH possesses a TV  (yes=1, no=0) 0.38
0.07  Telephone HH possesses a telephone connection  (yes=1, no=0) 0.25
0.18  Radio HH possesses a radio  (yes=1, no=0) 0.38
Subjective score on access to extension service (1= lowest, 5= 
highest) 3.10  Extension service 1.06
0.79  Farmer union HH participates in the farmer union  (yes=1, no=0) 0.41
Wealth   
 Farm size Total area operated by household in square meter c/ 15,999 11,664
15.28  Off farm income Share of off-farm income in total cash income (2006) (in %) 22.75
Geographic characteristics   
520.33  Elevation + Elevation of the house in meter above the sea level (m.a.s.l.) 241.87
43.60   Distance to city + Distance to Yen Chau city in minutes by motorbike 36.44
0.12 Adoption HH has adopted and uses agroforestry on at least one plot  (yes=1, no= 0.32
Soil and farm characteristics   
30.91 Poor soil Share of area with poor soil (in %)  33.59
56.09 Medium soil Share of area with medium soil (in %)  36.54
0.35 Land availability Total area operated by household in hectare per capita  0.22
0.41 Upland allocation Area of titled upland per capita > village average  (yes=1, no=0)  0.49
3.74 Relation to village 
head 
Number of problems for which it is easy to get help from the village 
head
2.20
 b/
Support and access to credit   
0.07 Support HH received support to implement agroforestry  (yes=1, no=0)  0.26
0.27 Credit constraint HH is credit constrained in the formal market  (yes=1, no=0)  0.45
Land policy   
70.56 Titled land Share of titled upland area on total area operated (in %)  39.13
79.28 Villagers expectin
reallocation 
Share of household in village expecting a reallocation (in %) 13.14 
   292 Obs.    
+ these variables are present in both models 
a/     HH=Household 
b/    Respondents were asked to assess the easiness in receiving help from village mass organization and village 
head to (i) borrow money for education; (ii) borrow money for health expenses; (iii) borrow money for any 
positive event; (iv) borrow money for any negative event; (v) borrow a water buffaloe; (vi) ask for labour 
c/    Variable logged in the regression 
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 Table 2: Description and summary statistics of Plot-level variables  
Restricted 
sample (Nk) 
Full sample    
  
(N)   
Variable   Mean Mean Std. Dev. Std. Dev.   
0.04 0.08 Adopt Agroforestry is adopted on this plot (yes=1, no=0) 0.19 0.27 
 
0.30 0.30 Poor soil Soil on this plot is of medium quality (yes=1, no=0) 0.46 0.46 
 
0.55 0.54 0.50 0.50 Medium soil Soil on this plot is of poor quality (yes=1, no=0) 
 
0.23 0.21 0.20 0.19 Area share Area of this plot divided by household farm size 
 
The slope of this plot is very steepa/ (yes=1, no=0) 0.37 0.38 0.48 0.48 Steepness 
 
0.75 0.80 0.43 0.40 Land title The plot is operated under land title (yes=1, no=0) 
 
   1190 Obs.   567 Obs.     
a/ The slope was assessed by respondents on a scale from one (=level) to five, using a graph for illustration. 
 
Table 3: Tenurial arrangement and year of land acquisition 
% Plots a/ % Household b/ Year of 
acquisition (mean)     
Operated under title 74.9 81.5 1989 
Operated without title 25.1 50.5 2002 
 Leased in from private household 6.8 19.5 2006 
 Borrowed to private household  10.1 19.9 2002 
 Village land fund 4.8 13.0 2000 
 No agreement 2.3 8.2 1997 
  Non registered purchase 1.0 2.1 2002 
a/  Upland plots operated in 2007 (T=1190) 
b/  Households using at least one plot under such arrangement (N=292) 
6 Results 
Land allocation in Yen Chau district 
Due to the region’s formerly low population density and ethnic diversity, land management in 
the NMR has proceeded differently from the rest of the country. During the period of 
cooperative farming informal permission was given to individuals to cultivate the uplands 
bordering the common land as long as collective goals were met. With the passing of the first 
land law in 1988 farmers were encouraged to clear forest and upland areas as only the 
common land was distributed following official criteria.  
The application of the 1993 law and the issuance of LURC followed a long process: some of 
the households received a title in 1991 while others, few kilometres away and usually on 
higher altitudes, received a first title only in 1999.  We summarize the issuance of process in 
the study area in three phases: 
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 • From 1991 to 1996: a first allocation was achieved in part of the lowland villages. The 
allocation was carried out by commune and village officials, with some supervision by 
provincial-level staff. Respondents reported that despite the official criteria established 
(family size, soil quality), land was generally allocated to the actual users, without being 
properly measured. In some Thai villages only upland areas were registered on the 
certificate and the allocation of paddy land remained under the authority of the village 
heads.  
• After 1998, the provincial administration implemented a second wave of land allocation. 
Upland villages, where allocation had not yet taken place, were issued the first 
certificates. In other villages land was reallocated and land titles reissued. During this 
second wave, provincial officials were actively involved in order to enforce the law’s 
implementation. Agricultural and residential plots, including paddy fields, were 
allocated following the official criteria, formally measured, and the lands were titled and 
recorded in cadastral maps. A share of non-allocated land (paddy and upland) was kept 
as a village fund and controlled by the village board for allocation to newly established 
households. 
• Since 2003 a third allocation wave has been taking place. In villages where reallocation 
occurred (five out of our twenty sample villages), land titles had yet to be reissued in 
2007. The official rationale for this reallocation was firstly to provide land to newly 
established and landless households and secondly to combine scattered small plots as a 
way to increase farm productivity, following the land use plan established by the 
Province16. 
Despite the existence of long-term use right certificates originally issued for twenty to fifty 
years, some households have seen their land reallocated two times at five year intervals. 
Whereas only a minority of farmers have been directly affected by reallocations (35% of our 
sample), most live in villages or close to villages where a reallocation has or is going to occur. 
As a consequence, 80% of interviewed farmers believe that a reallocation will take place in 
their village before the end of their 20 year use right, an expression of the very low trust 
households currently have in land institutions.  
 
 
                                                 
16 However, in light with the current situation, it appears that this reallocation is linked to a larger scale plan to 
introduce rubber plantations in the district.  
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 Knowledge and adoption of soil conservation technologies 
We report in Table 4 descriptive qualitative and quantitative results on farmers’ knowledge on 
soil conservation technologies and adoption behaviour. Farmers were asked to enumerate the 
methods they know to limit erosion. Most farmers - three quarters - know at least one SCT 
and are therefore aware of problems related to erosion. When looking separately at different 
technologies, the diffusion rates17 vary widely. Knowledge on terraces, contour ploughing, or 
ditch18 techniques has been spread mostly through social networks, whereas other 
technologies have been diffused by more formal communication channels such as media and 
external organizations. With the exception of the hedgerow technique, the governmental 
agricultural extension service and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) appear as 
secondary sources of information on SCT.  
Table 4 reports adoption rates, defined as the share of household knowing a technology and 
currently using the technology on at least one of their plot. An effectiveness score based on 
adopters’ perception is also reported. It appears clearly that the methods requiring a relatively 
high input of labor or take up a considerable portion of land (terraces, vegetative contour 
strips, agroforestry and cover crops) are adopted the least although they are found to be 
effective. Short-term and low extra-input technologies (contour ploughing or ditches) are 
more attractive to farmers but are deemed to be less effective. Among adoption constraints 
(i.e. the main reason given by respondents for not adopting a known technique), the lack of 
land is frequently cited in the case of vegetative strips, cover crop, or agroforestry. Lack of 
labour was identified by farmers as an important constraint for building terraces and planting 
cover crops. Respondents emphasized lacking access to seedlings as a major reason for not 
adopting agroforestry, and, with regard to ditches, their ineffectiveness against erosion. The 
differentiated answers given by respondents show that farmers’ perception of costs and 
benefits over time differ significantly between SCT, so does their adoption decision.  
The dynamics of the adoption of selected SCT over time (at the plot level) are shown in 
Figure 1. In 1990, agroforestry was practiced on 1.8% of all the plots operated at that period 
and ditches were used on 2%. Note that the graph does not account for a cohort effect due to 
the under-representation of older generations. Nonetheless, one can observe that changes in 
                                                 
17 The term diffusion is used in the adoption literature for either adoption diffusion, or knowledge diffusion. In 
this paper, diffusion refers to knowledge. 
18 The ditch technique consists of channels oriented diagonally to the slope of the land so that rain water is 
captured and channeled off the field. This technique is used for soil conservation rather than water 
conservation as the channels are rarely connected to the paddy fields. 
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 adoption rates follow institutional changes. The adoption of ditches has clearly accelerated 
following the first land law in 1988 (decollectivization), while agroforestry has slowed down. 
The issuance of Red Books in the study area has been clearly followed by a considerable 
acceleration of adoption of the two technologies, although the increase of agroforestry is less 
pronounced.  
Table 4: Knowledge about and adoption of SCT 
Knowing 
SCT ( )kN  
Knowledge
source 
Currently
using 
SCT
Effectiveness
score
Adoption constraints  
 
(0: no effect;
 (1) (2) (% of N a/) (% of Nk) 10: very effective)
Rel/Neighbb/ Ditches or channel 56.2 61.0 5.7 Not effective Lack of labor 
No access to 
seedlings Agroforestry 42.5 27.4 6.7 Lack of land Extension 
Terrace 20.9 9.8 7.0Rel/Neighb Lack of labor  Expensive 
Lack of 
Equipment  Contour ploughing 20.2 88.1 6.1Rel/Neighb No erosion  
Cover crop 12.7 10.8 7.3Media Lack of land Lack of labor 
Vegetative strips 5.8 11.8 6.0Media Lack of land  
Mulching 3.4 20.0 5.7Media Lack of labor  
Other SCT 5.1 66.7 5.8   Own initiative
TOTAL (at least 
one) 53.4
c/74.7    
a/  N=292: non farmers and farmers growing paddy rice only are excluded 
b/  Relative or Neighbor 
c/  Share of total households using at least one SCT  
 
Figure 1: Adoption of ditches and agroforestry (in share of plots cultivated, per year) 
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Source: own data 
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 Determinants of knowledge and adoption of soil conservation – the household-level model 
Table 4 presents results of the household-level probit model with sample selection. In the last 
column we report the marginal effects on the probability to adopt agroforestry conditionally 
on knowing it. The model has a good predictive quality, with over 90% of households 
correctly predicted.  
The first part of Table 4 shows that vertical connections, the possession of a radio, the 
participation in the farmer union, and the size of the operated farm are positive and significant 
determinants of farmers’ knowledge of agroforestry. Access to extension service and 
education however are not significant. However, these variables are found to have no impact 
on the adoption decision of agroforestry. 
We find that the this decision is positively influenced by farmers’ soil characteristics. The 
model predicts that, ceteris paribus and conditionally on knowledge, receiving material 
support increases the probability of practicing agroforestry by 70 percentage points. The share 
of titled land does not appear as a significant determinant of households’ adoption decision. 
As expected, the threat of a future reallocation in the village results in a negative effect but is 
only significant at the 15% level of error probability. 
The likelihood ratio test of selection bias on the parameter ρ does not reject the null-
hypothesis ( ρ = 0 ), an indication  that the estimated parameters of adoption determinants on 
the exposed subpopulation are not affected by exposure bias. As mentioned earlier the 
aggregation of plot-level variables to the household level induces a loss of information with 
respect to plot-level tenure and natural characteristics because of variable plot conditions 
within a same household. We thus estimate a plot-level model of adoption. 
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 Table 5: Household-level model, Probit with sample selection estimates 
Conditional probability: Coefficient estimates: ( )1 2Pr 1 1i iy y= = ( )1 2Pr 1 1i iy y= =  ( )2Pr 1iy = and  
Marginal effect 
(x100)     Coefficient z-stat a/ z-stat a/ 
: Household knows agroforestry as a SCT (yes=1) iy2
 Age household head -0.022 (0.51) - 
 Age household head² 0.000 (0.22) - 
 Education (dummy) 0.466 (1.27) - 
 Peer connections 0.032 (0.25) 0.186  (0.25) 
 Vertical connections 0.081* (1.91) 0.473  (0.62) 
 Television 0.290 (1.06) 1.648  (0.59) 
 Telephone 0.176 (0.49) 1.041  (0.39) 
 Radio 0.571*** (2.79) 3.435  (0.63) 
 Extension service 0.125 (1.59) 0.730  (0.72) 
 Farmer union 0.393* (1.83) 2.215  (0.72) 
 Off farm income 0.006 (1.34) 0.038  (0.55) 
 Farm size (log) 0.412*** (3.20) 2.403  (0.69) 
Elevation x 10-3  -0.869 (1.51) - 
 Distance to city 0.001 (0.40) - 
    Constant -4.362*** (3.37)  
: Household uses agroforestry on at least one plot (yes=1) iy1
 Age household head 0.032 (0.35) 0.432  (0.27) 
 Age household head² 0.000 (0.50) -0.007  (0.47) 
 Education (dummy) 0.980 (1.62) 33.999  (1.63) 
 Adults 0.035 (0.25) 0.603  (0.25) 
 Relation to village head 0.143* (1.72) 2.477 * (1.82) 
 Poor soil (share) 0.025** (2.28) 0.436 *** (2.64) 
 Medium soil (share) 0.020** (2.06) 0.343 ** (2.43) 
 Land availability -0.593 (0.62) -10.292 (0.59) 
 Upland allocation (dummy) 0.369 (1.13) 6.766 (1.07) 
 Support (dummy) 2.075*** (3.58) 70.200 *** (5.70) 
 Credit constraint (dummy) 0.436 (1.37) 8.744 (1.18) 
 Titled land (share) 0.002 (0.34) 4.426 (0.52) 
 Villagers expecting reallocation (share) -0.019* (1.71) -0.332  (1.56) 
Elevation x 10-3 -0.268 (0.19) -9.721  (0.41)  
 Distance to Yen Chau city -0.010 (1.02) -0.169  (1.14) 
    Constant -2.083  (0.80)    
Observation     292
Censored   168
-221.67Log likelihood     
-0.47 (0.487)Estimated ρ (P-value of Wald-test independence equation(ρ=0)) 
Correctly predicted(%) cut-off: p>0.50 91.4
Adopters correctly predicted(%) cut-off: p>0.50 61.8
Adopters correctly predicted(%) cut-off: p>0.25 85.3
a/ Robust z-statistics in parentheses:  *,(**),[***] significant at 10%, (5%) and [1%] level of error probability 
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 Determinants of adoption of soil conservation – the plot-level model 
Table 6 presents the probit estimates of the plot-level model. The low predictive quality of the 
model is explaind by the presence of numerous household-level regressors, as well as the low 
plot-level adoption rate. 
 
Table 6: Plot level model, Probit estimates 
( )3Pr 1ijy =  
  Marginal effects 
z-stat a/   (x 100) 
3ijy : agroforestry has been adopted on this plot (yes=1)  
Age household head 0.477 * (1.94)  
Age household head²  -0.005 ** (2.29)  
Education (dummy) 0.058 * (1.75)  
Adults 0.260 (0.73)  
Relation to village head 0.430 ** (2.22)  
Poor soil (dummy) 17.185 *** (4.78)  
Medium soil (dummy) 6.142 *** (3.69)  
Area share (%) 7.388 *** (4.57)  
Steepness (dummy) 0.802 (1.07)  
Land availability -3.212 (1.19)  
Upland allocation (dummy) 1.349 (1.55)  
 Support (dummy) 14.009 *** (4.27) 
 Credit constraint (dummy) 1.370 (1.25) 
 Land title (dummy) 1.406 * (1.74) 
 Villagers expecting reallocation (share) -0.108 *** (3.29) 
Elevation x 10-3  -3.871 (0.78) 
 Distance to Yen Chau city 0.007  (0.25) 
Observations   567
Log likelihood   -99.46
Pseudo R-squared   0.37
Correctly predicted (%) - cut-off: p>0.50   92.6
Adopters correctly predicted (%) - cut-off: p>0.50  22.2
Adopters correctly predicted (%) - cut-off: p>0.25   62.2
a/ z-statistics in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by household. 
*,(**),[***] significant at 10%, (5%) and [1%] level of error probability 
Farmers’ endowment in human capital is found to significantly influence adoption in the plot-
level model. The probability of adoption increases with age of the household head but 
decreases beyond 50 years old. The education level has a significantly positive effect, as does 
the household’s social capital measured by its relation to the village head. However, these 
effects remain small in magnitude. 
As in the household-level model, we find soil characteristics to be important determinants of 
farmers’ choice. Agroforestry is rather used on poor and medium soils than on fertile ones. 
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 The relative size of the plots also matters in the adoption decision. We find that 62% of 
adopters chose the first or the second largest of their plots to implement the technology. In 
agroforestry especially, space is a constraint as both trees and hedgerows require some space 
to grow, lead to shading of the crop, and compete for nutrients. However, the overall 
households’ land availability is not found to be significant, which is surprising since farmers 
mentioned this constraint repeatedly during interviews. Household endowment in upland 
relative to their village is significant at the 15% level only, and the size of the estimated effect 
is of small magnitude. 
As already observed in the household-level model, support is found to be an important 
determinant of adoption decision, although the measured effect is of smaller magnitude. A 
plot belonging to a household that has been supported by an external organization has a 
higher probability by 3 to 24 percentage points of being covered by agroforestry than other 
plots. We find that access to formal credit has a negative but not significant effect on adoption 
probability. Although counter-intuitive at a first glance, this result is less surprising 
considering the low initial cash costs requirement of agroforestry beside the purchase of seeds 
and fertilizer. Pagiola (1995)19 argues that poor farmers, who are generally also risk adverse, 
may have higher incentives than their richer cohort to invest in inexpensive sustainable 
practices. Furthermore, the fact that access to formal credit is not a significant constraint and 
that outside material support is a major adoption determinant indicates that many farmers lack 
motivation to undertake such an investment on their own20.  
Finally, variables capturing the land policy effect are both significant. We find that plots 
operated under land title have a greater probability of being covered by agroforestry than 
                                                 
19 Cited by Shively (2001), who finds however that in the Philippines, a greater access to credit smoothes the 
effect of adoption of soil conservation technology on consumption loss, and therefore encourages adoption. 
20 An illustrative example is given by a qualitative case study conducted in one of the H’mong sample villages 
by social scientists: there, farmers were given seeds and a lump sum of 300,000 VND (around 20 US$) to test 
hedgerows on their upland fields. In spite of this initial support, only a small fraction of these farmers still 
maintain these hedgerows nowadays; and if they do so this mostly happens out of fear to be punished 
otherwise by the administrative office which supported them. Farmers mentioned the lack of profitability of 
this technique and the competition with their primary cash crop, maize, for land, sunlight, and nutrients as 
major disadvantages. The findings of this case study are however not fully representative of the situation in 
the whole of Yen Chau district as indicated by statistical tests: a Hausman specification test concludes that 
the full sample and the restricted sample (excluding this village) estimates differ systematically. A likelihood 
ratio test concludes that the restricted sample model fits the data better. 
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 other plots. The marginal effect, significantly different from zero at the 10% level, is of small 
magnitude: it ranges between 0 to 2.8 percentage points21.  
The marginal effect of the share of villagers expecting land reallocation before the end of the 
use term is highly significant and negative. An increase by one percentage point of this share 
leads to a decrease in the probability of adoption by 0.1 percentage points. As such 
information is being picked up through the village gossip, individual farmers may use this 
information to decide on whether the formal land titles for their plots are safe enough to invest 
in agroforestry.  
7 Discussion and conclusions 
The reforms of land institutions by the state in the 1990s were intended to increase tenure 
security, establish a real estate market, and thereby increase investment incentives and boost 
agricultural production while fostering natural resource conservation. However, the 
implementation of the reforms has been a long and complicated process, especially in the 
mountainous regions where enforcement has been opposed by ethnic minority communities. 
Moreover, we find that in Yen Chau the state maintains a substantial control over land 
resources by carrying out land reallocations, which sends contradictory signals to farmers and 
results in tenure insecurity.  
Although the majority of farmers are aware of soil erosion and know methods to mitigate the 
problem, adoption rates of these methods remain very low. Farmers perceive these techniques 
to be economically unattractive, as they compete with the main cropping activities for scarce 
land and labour resources. In the case of agroforestry, we find that adoption is influenced by 
human and social capital, but more strongly by attributes of farmers’ land, such as plot size 
and soil characteristics. While credit access is not a significant determinant of adoption, 
material support by external agents strongly influences farmers’ decision, indicating a low 
initial motivation by land users to undertake such investments.  
 
                                                 
21 To test whether this effect of land title is due to the effect of the length of use (much longer for titled plot, cf. 
Table 3) we interact the title with a variable on the number of year used, but none of the three variables 
become significant. In other words, the length of use is neither an adoption factor when the plot is titled nor 
when it is not. 
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 In line with previous empirical studies on land titling we find little evidence that the tenure of 
land operated and registered under a formal title is perceived to be more secure, which should 
result in a higher propensity of farmers to make long-term investments in soil conservation, 
such as agroforestry-based practices. Rather, we find that the threat of future land 
reallocations discourages the adoption of such technologies, although the magnitude of this 
effect is relatively small. We conclude that local governments should better clarify the 
objectives of land use plans, especially when these entail land reallocations, in order to 
promote sustainable land use over the environmentally damaging practices that currently 
prevail. 
We further conclude that the economic attractiveness of SCT that have been promoted so far 
need to be addressed by interdisciplinary research to identify land use options that are 
economically competitive with the prevailing cropping activities and also serve a soil 
conservation purpose.  
Soil conservation is a public good as long as its benefits extend not only to the land users but 
to the society as a whole. Our findings show that farmers face knowledge, economic, and 
institutional constraints that reduce their capacity and incentive to invest in long-term soil 
conservation technologies. These findings may encourage decision-makers and development 
organizations in fragile areas not only to promote SCT, but also to actively support their 
adoption by farmers in order to address societal issues of water safety, food security, and 
sustainable rural development. 
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